This paper provides a model of optimal investment timing in a decentralized firm under conditions of agency and asymmetric information. Using a real options approach, we show that an underlying option to invest can be decomposed into two components: a manager's option and an owner's option. The terms of the manager's option are determined by an optimal contracting model, and provide an incentive for the manager to both extend effort and truthfully reveal his private information. The implied investment behavior differs significantly from that of standard real options models. In particular, there will be greater inertia in investment, in that the model leads to the manager having an even greater "option to wait" than the owner. The interplay between the twin forces of hidden information and hidden action leads to markedly different investment outcomes than when only one of the two forces is at work.
Introduction
One of the most important topics in corporate finance is the formulation of the optimal investment strategies of firms. There are two components of the investment decision: how much to invest and when to invest. The first is the capital allocation decision and the second is the investment timing decision. The standard textbook prescription for the capital allocation decision is that firms should only invest in projects if their net present values (NPV) are positive. Similarly, a standard framework for the investment timing decision is the real options approach. The real options approach posits that the opportunity to invest in a project is analogous to an American call option on the investment project, and the timing of investment is economically equivalent to the optimal exercise decision for an option. The real options approach is well summarized in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Trigeorgis (1996) . 1 However, both the simple NPV rule and the standard real options approach fail to account for the incentive problems that confront decentralized firms. In most modern corporations, shareholders delegate the investment decision to managers, taking advantage of their special skills and expertise. In such decentralized settings, there are likely to be both information asymmetries (e.g., managers are better informed than owners about projected cash flows) and agency issues (e.g., unobserved managerial effort, perquisite consumption, empire building).
A number of papers in the corporate finance literature provide models of capital budgeting under asymmetric information and agency. 2 The focus of this literature is on the first piece of the investment decision: the amount of capital allocated to managers for investment.
Thus, this literature provides predictions on whether firms over-or under-invest relative to the benchmark of perfect information and no agency costs. The focus of this paper is on the second piece of the investment decision: the timing of investment. We extend the real options framework to account for the issues of information and agency in a decentralized firm. Analogous to the notions of over-or under-investment, our paper provides results on hurried or delayed investment. 1 The application of the real options approach to investment is quite broad. Brennan and Schwartz (1985) use an option pricing approach to analyze investment in natural resources. McDonald and Siegel (1986) provided the standard continuous-time framework for analysis of a firm's investment in a single project. Majd and Pindyck (1987) enrich the analysis with a time-to-build feature. Dixit (1989) uses the real option approach to examine entry and exit from a productive activity. Triantis and Hodder (1990) analyze manufacturing flexibility as an option. Titman (1985) and Williams (1991) In the standard real options paradigm, there are no agency conflicts as it is assumed that the option's owner makes the exercise decision. 3 However, in this paper, an owner delegates the option exercise decision to a manager. Thus, the timing of investment is determined by the manager. The owner's problem is to design an optimal compensation contract under both hidden action and hidden information. The true quality of the underlying project can be high or low. The hidden action problem is that the manager can influence the likelihood that the quality of the project is high. An optimal contract will have the property that the manager will be induced into providing costly (but unverifiable) effort. 4 The hidden information problem is that the underlying project's future cash flow contains a component that is only privately observable to the manager. Absent any mechanism that induces truth-telling, the manager may have an incentive to lie about the true quality of the project and divert value for his private interests. For example, the manager could divert privately observed cash flows by consuming excessive perquisites, building empires, or by working less hard to manage the project. An optimal contract (in accordance with the revelation principle) will induce the manager to truthfully reveal his private information about project quality, and thus no actual value diversion will take place in equilibrium.
Importantly, we show that the underlying option can be decomposed into two components:
a "manager's option" and an "owner's option." The manager's option has a payout upon exercise that is a function of the contingent compensation contract. Based on this contractual payout, the manager determines the exercise time. The owner's option has a payout, received at the manager's chosen exercise time, equal to the payoff from the underlying option minus the manager's compensation. The model provides the solution for the optimal compensation contract that comes as close as possible to the first-best no-agency solution.
The model implies investment behavior that differs substantially from that of the standard real options approach with no agency problems. In general, managers will display greater inertia in their investment behavior, in that they will invest later than implied by the firstbest solution. In essence, this is a result of the manager (even in an optimal contract) not 3 While our paper focuses on the agency issues that provide a disconnect between the interests of owners and shareholders, similar issues exist between stockholders and bondholders. Mello and Parsons (1992) , Mauer and Triantis (1994) , Leland (1998) , Mauer and Ott (2000) , and Morellec (2001 Morellec ( , 2003 examine the impact of agency conflicts on firm value using the real options approach. 4 As is standard in problems of moral hazard, we only consider parameter ranges under which exerting effort is desirable for the owner. Outside of this parameter region, the problem reduces to one of hidden information only.
having a full ownership stake in the option payoff. This less than full ownership interest implies that the manager has a greater "option to wait" than the owner.
An important aspect of the model is the interaction of hidden action and hidden information. In fact, we find that the nature of the optimal contract depends explicitly on the relative importance of these two forces. While we focus on the economically most interesting case in which both forces play a role in the optimal contract, it is instructive to consider two extremes. If the cost benefit ratio of inducing effort (a measure of the strength of the hidden effort component) is very low, then the hidden action component disappears from the optimal contract terms. Thus, if the nature of the underlying option is such that inducing effort is sufficiently inexpensive, then we are left with a simple problem of hidden information and the contract will simply reward the manager with informational rent. This is the setting of Maeland (2002) , which considers a real options problem with only hidden information about the exercise cost. 5 Conversely, as the cost benefit ratio of inducing effort becomes very high, then the hidden action component dominates the optimal contract. The cost of inducing effort is so high as to no longer necessitate the payment of informational rents. When the cost benefit ratio of inducing effort is in an intermediate range, both forces are in effect, and the optimal compensation contract must induce effort and truthful revelation of private information. Interestingly, the interplay between hidden information and hidden action may actually reduce the inefficiency in investment timing, compared with the setting in which hidden information is the only friction. This is because the manager's additional option to exert effort makes his incentives more closely aligned with those of the owner.
In a later section, we generalize the model to allow for managers to display greater impatience than owners. There are several potential justifications for such an assumption. First, there are various models of managerial myopia that attempt to explain managers' preference for choosing projects with quicker pay-backs, even in the face of eschewing more valuable long-term opportunities. 6 Such models are based on information asymmetries and agency problems. Second, in our "investment timing" setting, greater impatience can represent the manager's preference for empire building or greater perquisite consumption and reputation 5 Bjerksund and Stensland (2000) provide a similar model to Maeland (2002) , where a principal delegates an investment decision to an agent who holds private information about the investment's cost. Brennan (1990) considers a setting in which managers attempt to signal the true quality of "latent" assets to investors through converting them into observable assets (e.g., exercising real options).
6 See Narayanan (1985), Stein (1989) and Bebchuk and Stole (1993) .
that comes from running a larger business sooner rather than later. Third, managers may simply have a shorter horizon (due to job loss, alternative job offers, death, etc.). Phrased in real options terms, managerial impatience leads to a smaller option to wait for the manager, potentially reversing the previously mentioned larger option to wait that appears in the base case model. While the base case model predicts that investment will never occur sooner than the first-best case, in this generalized setting investment can occur earlier or later than the first-best case.
The setting of our paper is most similar to that of Bernardo et al. (2001) . In a decentralized firm under asymmetric information and moral hazard, they examine the capital allocation decision, while we examine the investment timing decision. In their model, the firm's headquarters delegates the investment decision to a manager, who possesses private information about project quality. The manager can improve project quality through the exertion of effort, which is costly to the manager but unverifiable by headquarters. These two assumptions mirror our framework. In addition, managers have preferences for "empire building" in that they derive utility from overseeing large investment projects. This assumption is addressed in the generalized version of our model that appears in Section 5. Absent any explicit incentive mechanism, managers will always claim that all projects are of high quality and worthy of funding, and then provide the minimal amount of effort. As in our paper, they use an optimal contracting approach to jointly derive the optimal investment and compensation policies. An incentive contract is derived that induces truth-telling and minimizes the costs of agency. In equilibrium, they find that there will be under-investment in all states of the world. Our model provides an intertemporal analogy to their equilibrium:
in our base case model, we find that in equilibrium there will be delayed investment due to the information asymmetries and agency costs. 7
While our paper derives an optimal compensation contract that best aligns the incentives of owners and managers, other papers in the corporate finance literature analyze the capital 7 In a different setting, Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986) provide a model that combines an optimal wage contract with capital rationing. In their model, the manager and the market learn about managerial talent over time by observing investment outcomes. A conflict of interest arises because the manager wants to choose investment to maximize the value of his human capital while the shareholders want to maximize firm value. The optimal wage contract has the option feature that insures the manager against the possibility that an investment reveals his ability to be of low quality, but allows the manager to captures the gains if he is revealed to be of high quality. This option feature of the wage contract encourages the manager to take on excessive risks. Rationing capital mitigates the manager's incentive to over-invest. As a result, in equilibrium both under-and over-investment are possible.
budgeting problem under information asymmetry and agency using other control mechanisms. Harris et al. (1982) consider the case of capital allocation in a decentralized firm with multiple division managers. Managers have private information about project values. In addition, managers have private interests in overstating investment requirements, and then diverting the excess cash flows in order to minimize effort or to consume greater perquisites.
They focus on the role of transfer prices in allocating capital. Firms offer managers a menu of allocation/transfer price combinations. In equilibrium, truth-telling is achieved, and there can be both under-and over-investment. 8 Harris and Raviv (1996) use a very similar framework, but focus on a random auditing technology. By combining probabilistic auditing with a capital restriction, headquarters is able to learn the true project quality from the manager.
In equilibrium there will be both regions of under-and over-investment. Stulz (1990) considers a decentralized investment framework in which the manager has private information about investment quality and a preference for empire building. Absent any controls, the manager would always overstate the investment opportunities and invest all available cash. The owners of the firm use debt as a mechanism of aligning the interests of managers and shareholders.
By increasing the required debt payment, managers have less free cash flow to spend on investment projects. The optimal level of debt is chosen to trade off the benefits of preventing managers from investing in negative NPV projects when investment opportunities are poor with the costs of rationing managers away from taking positive NPV projects when investment opportunities are good. Again, in equilibrium there will be both under-and over-investment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setup of the model and simplifies the optimization program. Section 3 solves for the optimal contracts.
In Section 4, we analyze the implications of the model in terms of the stock price's reaction to investment, equilibrium investment lags, and the erosion of the option value due to the agency problem. Section 5 generalizes the model to allow for managers to display greater impatience than owners. Section 6 concludes. Appendices contain the solution details of the optimal contracts.
Model
In this section, we begin with a description of the model. We then, as a useful benchmark, provide the solution to the first-best no-agency investment problem. Finally, we present and simplify the full principal-agent optimization problem faced by the owner.
Setup
The principal owns an option to invest in a single project. We assume that the principal (owner) delegates the exercise decision to an agent (manager). Once investment takes place, the project provides a stream of cash flows. A portion of the cash flows is observable to both owner and manager, while another portion is privately observed only by the manager. Let P (t) represent the present value of the observable component of the project's cash flows, and θ the present value of the privately observed component of cash flows. Thus, the total value of the project is P (t) + θ. 9 The assumption that a portion of cash flows is only known by the manager and not verifiable by the owner is quite common in the capital budgeting literature. This information asymmetry invites a host of agency issues. Harris et al. (1982) posit that managers have incentives to understate project payoffs and to divert the free cash flow to themselves. In their model, such value diversion takes the form of managers reducing their level of effort. Stulz (1990) , Harris and Raviv (1996) and Bernardo et al. (2001) model managers as having preferences for perquisite consumption or empire building. In these models, managers have incentives to divert free cash flows to inefficient investments or to excessive perquisites. In all of these models, mechanisms are used by firms (i.e., incentive contracts, auditing, required debt payments) to mitigate such value diversion.
In a standard call option setting, exercise yields the difference between the observable value P (t) of the underlying asset and the exercise price, K. Thus, the payoff from exercise is typically P (t) − K. However, in the present model, the payoff from exercise also includes a privately observed random variable, θ, whose realization directly impacts the option payoff.
Thus, in this model the net payoff from exercise is P (t) + θ − K. Note that the problem could be equivalently formulated as one in which the total value of the project is P (t) and the effective cost of exercising the option is K − θ.
Let the value P (t) of the observable component of the underlying project evolve as a geometric Brownian motion:
where α is the instantaneous conditional expected percentage change in P (t) per unit time, σ is the instantaneous conditional standard deviation per unit time, and dz is the increment of a standard Wiener process. Let P 0 equal the value of the project at time zero, in that
. Both the owner and the manager are risk neutral, with the risk-free rate of interest denoted by r. 10 For convergence, we assume that r > α.
The private component of value, θ, may take on two possible values: θ 1 or θ 2 , with
One may interpret a draw of θ 1 as a "higher quality" project and a draw of θ 2 as a "lower quality" project. The effort of the manager plays an important role in determining the likelihood of obtaining a higher quality project.
The manager may affect the likelihood of drawing θ 1 by exerting a one-time effort, at time zero. If the manager exerts no effort, 12 the probability of drawing a higher quality project θ 1 equals q L . However, if the manager exerts effort, he incurs a cost ξ > 0 at time zero, but increases the likelihood of drawing a higher quality project θ 1 from q L to q H . Immediately after his exerting effort, the manager observes the private component of project quality. In order to ensure a positive "net" exercise price, we restrict θ 1 < K.
The owner does not observe the private component of value, θ, and thus cannot contract on θ. However, the manager can contract on the observable component of value, P (t).
Contingent on the level of P (t) at exercise, the manager is paid a wage. 13 The revelation 10 We rule out the time-zero selling-the-firm contract between the owner and the manager. This may be justified, for example, if the manager is liquidity constrained and cannot obtain financing.
11 In Section 3.3 we generalize the model to allow θ to have continuous distributions. 12 Without loss of generality, we may normalize the manager's lower effort level to zero. 13 In order for the compensation contract to provide any incentive to the agent, wages cannot be paid prior to the moment of exercise. However, the efficacy of paying wages after the moment of exercise depends on the information structure of the model. If θ remains perpetually unobservable and/or not enforceable in courts (as we assume in the model), then there is no benefit to paying wages after exercise; future wages would simply be discounted back to the values used in the model. However, if θ becomes partially (or fully) revealed at some future date, then the adverse selection problem (but not the moral hazard problem) can be mitigated through delaying the payment of wages until a future date.
principle will ensure that the private component of value will be truthfully revealed to the owner at exercise. The manager has limited liability and is always free to walk away. 14 In addition, renegotiation is not allowed. While commitment leads to inefficiency in investment timing ex-post, it increases the value of the project ex-ante.
In summary, the owner faces a problem with both hidden information (the owner does not observe the true realization of θ) and hidden action (the owner cannot verify the manager's effort level). The owner needs to provide compensation incentive to both (i) induce the agent exert effort at time zero and (ii) to have the agent reveal his type voluntarily and truthfully.
Before analyzing the optimal contract, we first briefly review the first-best no-agency solution that is used as the benchmark.
First-Best Benchmark (The Standard Real Options Case)
As a benchmark, we consider the case in which there is no delegation of the exercise decision and the owner observes the true value of θ. Equivalently, this first-best solution can be achieved in a principal-agent setting, provided that θ is both publicly observable and contractible. Let W (P ; θ) denote the value of the owner's option, in a world where θ is a known parameter and P is the current level of P (t). Using standard arguments [i.e., Dixit and Pindyck (1994)], W (P ; θ) must solve the following differential equation:
Differential equation (2) must be solved subject to appropriate boundary conditions. These boundary conditions serve to ensure that an optimal exercise strategy is chosen:
Here, P * (θ) is the value of P (t) that triggers entry. The first boundary condition is the value-matching condition. It simply states that at the moment the option is exercised, the 14 The limited-liability condition is essential in delivering the investment inefficiency result in this context. Otherwise, with risk-neutrality assumptions for both the owner and the manager, and no limited liability, the first-best optimal investment timing may be achieved even in the presence of hidden information and hidden action. For a related discussion of limited liability, see Innes (1990) . An alternative mechanism of generating investment inefficiency in an agency context is to assume managerial risk aversion.
payoff is P * (θ)+θ−K. The second boundary condition is the smooth-pasting or high-contact condition. 15 This condition ensures that the exercise trigger is chosen so as to maximize the value of the option. The third boundary condition reflects the fact that zero is an absorbing barrier for P (t).
Closed-form solutions for the value of the owner's option at time zero, W (P 0 , θ), and the exercise trigger P * (θ) are easily obtained. The value of the first-best option value and exercise trigger can be written as:
where
and
Since the realized value of θ can be either θ 1 or θ 2 , we denote P * (θ 1 ) = P * 1 and P * (θ 2 ) = P * 2 . We shall always assume the initial value of the project is less than the lower trigger, P 0 < P * 1 , to ensure that there is always some positive option value inherent in the project. The ex-ante value of the owner's option in the first-best no agency setting is q H W (P 0 ; θ 1 )+ (1 − q H )W (P 0 ; θ 2 ). We can therefore write this first-best option value, V * (P 0 ), as:
It will prove useful in future calculations to define the present value of one dollar received at the first moment that a specified triggerP is reached. Denote this present value operator by the discount function D(P 0 ;P ). This is simply the solution to differential equation (2) subject to the boundary conditions that D(P ;P ) = 1, and D(0;P ) = 0. The solution can be written as:
15 See Merton (1973) for a discussion of the high-contact condition.
A Principal-Agent Setting
The owner offers the manager a contract at time zero. The contract specifies a payment made to the manager, paid at the time of exercise. The owner is committed to implementing the contract. The payment can be made contingent on the observable component of the value of the project at the time of exercise. Thus, in principle, for any realized value of P (t)
obtained at the time of exercise,P , a contracted wage w(P ) can be specified, provided that
The principal-agent setting leads to a decomposition of the underlying option into two options: an owner's option and a manager's option. The owner's option has a payoff function ofP + θ − K − w(P ), and the manager's option has a payoff function of w(P ). Upon exercise, the owner receives the value of the underlying project (P + θ), after paying the exercise price (K) and the manager's wage (w(P )). The manager's payoff is the value of the contingent wage, w(P ). Obviously, the sum of these payoff functions equals the payoff of the underlying option. The manager's option is of the tradition American call option variety, since the manager chooses the exercise time to maximize the value of his option. However, in this optimal contracting setting, it is the owner who ultimately controls the timing of exercise through the choice of contract parameters that induces the exercise policy that maximizes the value of its option. In addition, the manager also possesses a compound option, since the manager has the option to exert effort at time zero to increase the total expected surplus.
The properties of the manager's option thus are contingent upon this initial effort choice.
Since there are only two possible values of θ, for any w(P ) schedule, there can be at most two wage/exercise trigger pairs that will be chosen by the manager. 16 Thus, the contract need only include two wage/exercise trigger pairs from which the manager can choose: one that will be chosen by a manager when he observes θ 1 , and one chosen by a manager when he observes θ 2 . Therefore, the owner will offer a contract that promises a wage of w 1 if the option is exercised at P 1 and a wage of w 2 if the option is exercised at P 2 . The revelation principle will ensure that a manager who privately observes θ 1 will exercise at the P 1 trigger, and a manager who privately observes θ 2 will exercise at the P 2 trigger.
The owner's option has a payout function of P 1 +θ 1 −K−w 1 , if θ = θ 1 , and P 2 +θ 2 −K−w 2 , 16 We allow for the possibility of a pooling equilibrium in which only one wage/exercise trigger pair is offered. However, this pooling equilibrium always will be dominated by a separating equilibrium with two wage/exercise trigger pairs.
if θ = θ 2 . Thus, using the discounting function D( · ; · ) derived in (10) , conditional on the manager exerting effort, the value of the owner's option, π o (P 0 ; w 1 , w 2 , P 1 , P 2 ), can be written as:
The manager's option has a payout function of w 1 if θ = θ 1 and w 2 if θ = θ 2 . Conditional on the manager exerting effort, the value of the manager's option, π m (P 0 ; w 1 , w 2 , P 1 , P 2 ), can be written as:
For notational simplicity, we sometimes will drop the parameter arguments and simply write the owner's and manager's option values as π o (P 0 ), and π m (P 0 ), respectively.
The owner's objective is to maximize its option value through its choice of the contract terms w 1 , w 2 , P 1 , and P 2 . Thus, the owner solves the following optimization problem:
This optimization is subject to a variety of constraints induced by the hidden information and hidden action of the manager. The contract must induce the manager to accept the contract, exert effort, exercise at the trigger P 1 if θ = θ 1 , and exercise at the trigger P 2 if θ = θ 2 . It is the specification of these constraints to which we now turn.
There are both ex-ante and ex-post constraints. The ex-ante constraints ensure that the manager exerts effort and that the contract is accepted. These are the standard constraints in a static moral hazard setting. The ex-post constraints will ensure truth-telling in accordance with the revelation principle. That is, in equilibrium the manager will exercise at the trigger P 1 when it truly has a high quality project, and at the trigger P 2 otherwise. In addition, there will be ex-post constraints on limited liability.
• ex-ante incentive constraint:
The left side of this inequality is the value of the manager's option if effort is exerted minus the cost of effort. The right side is the value of the manager's option if no effort is exerted.
This constraint ensures that the manager will exert effort. Re-arranging the ex-ante incentive constraint (14) gives
where ∆q = q H − q L > 0.
• ex-ante participation constraint:
This constraint ensures that the total value to the manager of accepting the contract is non-negative.
The ex-post constraints ensure that managers will not have any incentive to divert value.
As discussed at the beginning of Section 2. . Importantly, these incentive compatibility conditions ensure that this value diversion does not occur; such deception only occurs off the equilibrium path.
• ex-post incentive constraints:
The second constraint will be shown not to bind, so only constraint (17) is relevant to our discussion. The first inequality ensures that a manager of a higher quality project will choose to exercise at P 1 . By truthfully revealing the private quality θ 1 through exercising at P 1 , the manager receives the wage w 1 . This inequality requires the payoff from truthful revelation to be greater than or equal to the present value of the payoff from misrepresenting the private quality by waiting until the trigger P 2 . The payoff from misrepresenting θ 1 as θ 2 is equal to the wage w 2 , plus the value of diverting the private component of value ∆θ.
These truth-telling constraints are common in the literature on moral hazard and asymmetric information. For example, entirely analogous conditions appear in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and Harris et al. (1982) .
• ex-post limited-liability constraints:
Therefore, the owner's problem has a total of six inequality constraints: the ex-ante incentive and participation constraints, and each of the two ex-post incentive and limitedliability constraints. Fortunately, the following four propositions simplify the problem in that we can reduce the number of constraints to two.
Proposition 1. The limited-liability condition for a manager of a θ 1 -type project does not
bind. That is, w 1 > 0.
Proof.
The first and second inequalities follow from (17) and (19) , respectively.
In order to motivate the manager to exert effort, we need to reward the manager with an option value larger than zero, which is the manager's reservation value. This leads to the following result.
Proposition 2. The ex-ante participation constraint (16) does not bind.
where the first inequality follows from ex-ante incentive constraint (15) and the limited liability condition for the type-θ 2 project.
The following result states that there is no rent for the manager of a θ 2 -type project.
Proposition 3.
The limited liability for a manager of a θ 2 -type project binds, in that w 2 = 0.
We verify the claim of this proposition in the appendix. The intuition is straightforward.
Giving the manager of a θ 2 -type project any positive rent implies a higher rent for managers of θ 1 -type projects in order to meet the truth-telling constraint of the manager of a θ 1 -type project. In order to minimize the rents subject to the manager's participation and incentive constraints, the owner shall give the manager of a θ 2 -type project zero ex-post rent.
Proposition 4 allows us to ignore (18) in the optimization problem.
Proposition 4.
Optimal contracts imply w 1 ≤ ∆θ.
A formal proof of this proposition appears in the appendix. Intuitively, if w 1 > ∆θ, then the manager of a θ 2 -type project would never accept the equilibrium contract with w 2 = 0.
This would clearly be inconsistent with Proposition 3.
Propositions 1-4 jointly simplify the owner's optimization problem as follows:
subject to
In summary, we now have a simplified optimization problem for the owner. Equation (20) is the owner's option value. Constraint (21) is the simplified ex-post incentive constraint for the manager of the θ 1 -type project. Constraint (22) ensures that it is in the manager's interest to extend his effort at time zero.
The following proposition demonstrates that at least one of the two constraints binds.
Proposition 5.
At least one of (21) and (22) binds.
The argument is immediate. If Proposition 5 did not hold, then reducing w 1 will increase the owner's value strictly without violating any of the constraints. Note that the two constraints can be written more succinctly as
Model Solution: Optimal Contracts
In this section, we provide the solution to the optimal contracting problem described in the previous section: maximizing (20) subject to inequality constraints (21) and (22) . We find that the nature of the solution depends on the parameter values. In particular, the solution depends explicitly on the magnitude of the cost benefit ratio of inducing the manager's effort. Depending on this magnitude, the optimal contract can take on three possible types:
a "pure hidden information" type, a "joint hidden information/hidden action" type, and a "pure hidden action" type.
General Properties of the Solution
Before we provide the explicit solutions for the three contract regions, we discuss some general properties of contracts that hold for all regions.
The following proposition demonstrates that the manager of the higher quality project will exercise at the first-best level. Intuitively, for any manager's option value that satisfies the constraint (23), the owner will always prefer to choose the first best timing trigger P * 1 , and vary the wage w 1 to achieve the same level of compensation. On the margin, for the good state it is cheaper for the owner to increase the wage than to deviate from optimal timing. Proposition 6. The optimal contracts have P 1 = P * 1 , for all admissible parameter regions.
Proof. Consider any candidate optimal contract w 1 ,P 1 ,P 2 withP 1 = P * 1 . The owner may improve his surplus by proposing an alternative contract ŵ 1 , P * 1 ,P 2 , in whichŵ 1 is chosen such that the manager's option has the same value as the first contract, in that (P 0 /P * 1 )
The newly proposed contract is clearly feasible, as it will also satisfy constraints (21) and (22) . For all such constant levels of the manager's option value, the owner's objective function (20) is maximized by choosing P 1 = P * 1 = arg max
As we shall now see, it is less costly for the owner to distort P 2 away from the first-best level than to distort P 1 away from the first-best level in order to provide the appropriate incentives to the manager. The next proposition demonstrates that delay (beyond first-best)
for the lower quality project is needed in order to create enough incentives for the manager of a higher-quality project not to imitate the one with a lower-quality project.
Proposition 7. For all admissible parameter regions, the investment trigger for a manager of a θ 2 -type project is (weakly) later than the first-best, in that P
Proof. Suppose P 2 < P * 2 . It is simple to show that this contract is dominated by the contract with P 2 = P * 2 . we can always increase P 2 without violating constraint (21) . Moreover, the objective function (20) is increasing in P 2 , for P 2 < P * 2 , irrespective of which constraint binds. Thus, any contract with P 2 < P * 2 is dominated by one with P 2 = P * 2 .
Intuitively, the necessity of inducing truth-telling leads the manager to display a greater "option to wait" than the first-best solution. In order to dissuade the manager of a θ 1 -type project from exercising at the trigger P 2 , the contract must sufficiently increase P 2 above P * 2 to make such "lying" unprofitable.
We shall see that the extent to which P 2 exceeds P * 2 depends explicitly on the relative strengths of the forces of hidden information and hidden action. The amount of suboptimal delay will vary across the three regions, and will be discussed in greater detail below.
Optimal Contracts
We first define the three regions that serve to determine the nature of the optimal contract.
As a result of Proposition 5, the solution will depend on which of the two constraints (21) and (22) bind. The key to the contract is the magnitude of the ratio of costs to benefits of inducing the manager's effort, defined by ξ/∆q. The numerator is the direct cost of extending effort, and the denominator is the change in the likelihood of drawing a higher quality project θ 1 due to effort. The regions are then defined by where this cost benefit ratio falls relative to the present value of receiving a cash flow of ∆θ at three particular trigger values: P * 1 = P * (θ 1 ), P * 2 = P * (θ 2 ), and P * 3 = P * (θ 3 ), where
These present values are ordered by (P 0 / P * 3 ) β ∆θ < (P 0 /P * 2 ) β ∆θ < (P 0 / P * 1 ) β ∆θ. Note that another potential region in which ξ/∆q > (P 0 /P * 1 ) β ∆θ exists, however in this range the costs of effort are so high as to no longer justify the exertion of effort in equilibrium. Thus, we do not consider this region. 17 17 A proof of this result is available from the authors by request.
Because optimal contracts specify P 1 = P * 1 and w 2 = 0 across all three regions, we may focus on P 2 and w 1 when we describe the optimal contracts in each of the three regions. The proofs detailing the solution are provided in Appendix A.
• Hidden Information Only Region: ξ/∆q < (P 0 /P * 3 ) β ∆θ
In this region, we have
where θ 3 is given in (24) .
The net costs of inducing effort are low enough so that there is no need for the firm to have to compensate the manager for extending effort. In this range, the ex-ante incentive constraint does not bind, and therefore the cost of effort does not find its way into the optimal contract. 18 The compensation that the manager of the θ 1 -type project receives is purely an informational rent that induces the manager to exercise at the first-best trigger P * 1 , in accordance with the revelation principle. Since w 1 is relatively low in this region, the P 2 trigger needs to be high (relative to the first-best trigger P * 2 ) in order to dissuade the manager of the θ 1 -type project from deviating from the equilibrium first-best trigger P * 1 . We can use these contract terms to place a value on the owner's and manager's option values. The owner's and manager's option values, π o (P 0 ) and π m (P 0 ), respectively, can be written as:
It is interesting to note that the solution for the owner's option value is observationally equivalent to the first-best solution in which one substitutes θ 3 for the lower project quality θ 2 . In such a setting, the owner will choose to exercise at P * 1 if θ = θ 1 and at P * 3 if θ = θ 3 . Thus, the impact of the costs of hidden information is fully embodied by a reduction of project quality in the low state.
• Joint Hidden Information/Hidden Action Region:
Here, both the ex-ante and ex-post constraints bind. Since now the manager must be induced into providing effort, w 1 must be high enough to provide enough compensation for the ex-ante incentive constraint (22) to bind. This reflects the hidden action component of the contract. In addition, the exercise trigger P 2 must be high enough to dissuade the manager of the θ 1 -type project from deviating from the equilibrium first-best trigger P * 1 . Thus, in this region, P 2 is set so that the ex-post incentive constraint (21) binds, ensuring that the revelation principle holds. This requires that P 2 be above the full-information trigger P * 2 . This deviation from the full-information trigger reflects the hidden information component of the contract.
Importantly, P 2 is lower in this region than it was in the hidden information only region. This is due to the fact that in this joint region w 1 is now higher in order to induce effort. This higher wage makes it easier to satisfy the truth-telling constraint, and no longer necessitate as great a deviation from P * 2 in order to prevent managers of the θ 1 -type project from pretending to have a θ 2 -type project. Therefore, perhaps surprisingly, moral hazard serves to increase investment efficiency since the increased share of the firm that must go to compensate the manager leads the manager to more fully internalize the benefits of efficient investment timing. The owner's and manager's option values, π o (P 0 ) and π m (P 0 ), respectively, can be written as:
The owner's option value deviates from the first-best value, V * (P 0 ) in (9) in two ways. First, the hidden information rents effectively make the manager mark down his privately observed component of cash flows from θ 2 to θ 3 ; similar to that in the pure hidden information region.
Second, the exercise trigger for a manager of a θ 2 -type project is equal to P J , which is larger than P * 2 . Note that the only difference between π o (P 0 ) in this region and in the pure hiddeninformation region is the different terms for the exercise trigger: P J versus P * 3 . Here, the trigger is lower due to the hidden action component.
• Hidden Action Only Region:
In this parameter range, we have
The equilibrium triggers equal those of the first-best outcomes. The moral hazard costs are so high that the rent needed for motivating high effort (via the ex-ante incentive constraint) is sufficiently large so that the ex-post incentive constraints do not demand additional rents. That is, the wage needed to motivate the manager to extend effort ends up being high enough so that the manager of the θ 1 -type project no longer needs P 2 to exceed P * 2 in order to dissuade him from deviating from the equilibrium trigger P * 1 . Thus, the contract is entirely driven by the need to motivate effort, as the ex-post incentive constraint that reflects hidden information does not bind.
The owner's and manager's option values, π o (P 0 ) and π m (P 0 ), respectively, can be written as:
The owner's option value is equal to the first-best solution V * (P 0 ) characterized in (9) , minus the present value of the rent paid to the manager in order to induce effort. Figure 1 summarizes the details of the optimal contracts through the three regions. The upper and lower graphs plot the equilibrium trigger strategy P 2 and wage payment w 1 in terms of effort cost ξ, respectively. The upper graph shows that the trigger strategy for the manager of the θ 2 -type project is flat and equal to P * 3 for ξ in the pure hidden information region; is decreasing and convex in ξ for the joint hidden action/hidden information region;
and is flat and equal to the first-best trigger level P * 2 for ξ in the pure hidden action. The equilibrium trigger P 2 is closer to the first-best level, for higher level of ξ, ceteris paribus.
The lower graph plots corresponding wage contracts for a manager of the θ 1 -type project.
For low levels of ξ (pure hidden information region), he only needs to be compensated with pure informational rents. In the joint hidden information/hidden action region, w 1 increases linearly in ξ. For sufficiently high ξ, the manager of a θ 1 -type project is sufficiently rewarded so as to exercise at the first-best level.
An Extension to Cases with Continuous Distributions of θ
For ease of presentation, our basic model uses a simple two-point distribution for θ. In order to check the robustness of our results, we generalize our model to allow for admissible continuous distributions of θ on θ,θ in Appendix B. In this setting, the principal designs the contract such that the manager will find it optimal to exert effort at time zero and then reveal their θ truthfully by choosing the recommended equilibrium strategy P (θ) and w(θ).
The managers are protected by ex-post limited liability in that w(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ. Also, the manager's participation is voluntary at time zero. We show that the following key results remain valid:
1. Agency problems (hidden information and hidden action) lead to a delayed investment timing decision, compared with first-best trigger levels; 2. Introducing hidden action into the model at time zero lowers agency costs, because the manager has an option to align his incentives better with the owner by exerting effort at time zero. This leads to an investment timing trigger closer to the first-best level.
In addition, the model predicts that the manager with the lowest present value of privately observed cash flows θ receives no rents, in that w(θ) = 0 as in our basic setting. 19 The ex-ante participation constraint does not bind, because the limited liability condition for the manager and ex-ante incentive constraint together provide enough incentive for the manager with any ex-post realized θ to participate, as in our basic setting. For technical convenience, we have assumed that the distribution of θ under effort first-order stochastically dominates that under no effort. Intuitively, the manager is more likely to draw a "better" distribution of θ after exerting effort than not exerting effort. Under those conditions, 20 managers of higher quality 19 Recall that the manager with θ2 receives no rents. 20 See Appendix B for other technical conditions. projects will exercise at lower equilibrium trigger strategies and receive higher equilibrium wages.
We may further generalize our model by allowing for multiple discrete choices of effort levels. One can solve this problem by following a similar two-step procedure: (i) first solving for the optimal contract for each given level of effort; and (ii) then choosing the "optimal" level of effort for the owner by searching for the maximum among owner's option value across all effort levels. Subtle technical issues arise when we allow for effort choice to be continuous. 21 However, the basic approach and intuition remain valid.
Model Implications
In this section, we analyze several of the more important implications of the model. First, Section 4.1 examines the stock price reaction to investment (or failure to invest). We shall see that the stock price will move by a discrete jump due to the information released at the trigger P * 1 . Investment at P * 1 signals good news about project quality and the stock price jumps upward; failure to invest at P * 1 signals bad news about project quality and the stock price falls downward. Second, a clear prediction of our model is that the principal-agent problem will introduce inertia into a firm's investment behavior, in that investment will on average be delayed beyond first-best. Section 4.2 considers the factors that influence the expected lag in investment. Third, specifically because the timing of investment differs from that of the first-best outcome, the principal-agent problem results in a welfare loss and reduction in the owner's option value. Section 4.3 analyzes the comparative statics of the welfare loss and owner's option value with respect to the key parameters of the model.
In this section, we focus our analysis on the contract that prevails in the joint hidden information/ hidden action region. It is in this region that the incentive problems are the richest and most meaningful. The terms of the contract and resulting option values are displayed in equations (29)-(32).
Stock Price Reaction to Investment
In this section, we analyze the stock price reaction to the information released via the manager's investment decision. 22 The manager's investment decision will signal to the market the true value of θ, and the stock price will reflect this information revelation. Importantly, this will allow for the manager's compensation contract to be contingent on the firm's stock price. That is, while in the model we have made the incentive contract's wages to be contingent on the manager's investment decision, the wages can also be made contingent on the stock price.
The equity value of the firm is equal to the value of the owner's option value given in (31) . Prior to the point at which P (t) reaches the threshold P * 1 , the market does not know the true value of θ: the market believes that θ = θ 1 with probability q H and θ = θ 2 with probability 1 − q H .
Once the process P (t) hits the threshold P * 1 , the manager's unobserved component of cash flows is fully revealed. The manager's investment behavior signals to the market the true value of θ. If the manager exercises the option at P * 1 , then the manager reveals to the market that the privately observed component of cash flows is high. Therefore, the firm's value instantly jumps to S u , given by
If the manager does not exercise his option at P * 2 , then the market infers that the manager's privately observed component of cash flows is low. Then, the firm's value instantly drops to S d , given by Figure 2 plots the stock price S as a function of P , the current value of the process P (t).
For all P < P * 1 , S (P ) = π o (P ), where π o is given in (31). For P = P * 1 , S(P ) = S u if investment is undertaken, and S(P ) = S d if investment is not undertaken. The jump in the stock price at P * 1 is a result of the information revealed by the manager's actions. This result is consistent with the empirical findings in McConnell and Muscarella (1985) .
They find that announcements of unexpected increases in investment spending lead to increases in stock prices, and vice versa for unexpected decreases. 22 We thank the referee for suggesting this discussion.
Since the stock price movement at the trigger P * 1 reveals the true value of θ, the manager's incentive contract can be made contingent on the stock price. For example, the manager could be paid a bonus w 1 if the stock price jumps upward to S u . Since w 2 = 0, no bonus is paid if the stock price falls to S d . Similarly, such a contingent payoff could be implemented through a properly parameterized stock option grant.
Agency Problems and Investment Lags
In the standard real options setting, investment is triggered at the value maximizing triggers, P * 1 and P * 2 , for the higher and lower project quality outcomes, respectively. However, in our setting, while the trigger for investment in the higher quality state remains at P * 1 , investment in the lower quality state may be triggered at P J , which is higher than the firstbest benchmark level P * 2 . Let T and T * be the stopping times at which the option is exercised, in our model and the first-best setting, respectively. We denote Γ = E (T − T * ) as the expected time lag due to the principal-agent problem. A solution for such an expectation can be derived using Harrison (1985, Chapter 3). The expected lag is given by
where we assume that α > σ 2 /2 in order for this expectation to exist.
An important insight from Section 3 is that increases in the cost benefit ratio of inducing effort lead to less distortion in investment timing. That is, as the ratio ξ/∆q increases, the equilibrium trigger P J becomes closer to the first-best trigger P * 2 . This is confirmed by the following comparative static:
An increase in the volatility of the underlying project, σ, has an ambiguous effect on the expected time lag Γ. This can be seen from the following comparative static:
where ∂β/∂σ < 0. An increase in σ raises the option value and makes waiting more worthwhile, implying that both P * 2 and P J are larger, ceteris paribus. However, if the marginal cost benefit ratio for exerting effort is relatively high, in that
then the change of P J relative to the change in P * 2 is larger. Therefore, under such conditions the expected time lag increases in volatility σ.
An increase in the expected growth rate of the project, α, also has an ambiguous effect on the expected time lag Γ. This can be seen from the following comparative static:
However, if (43) holds, then expected time lag decreases with drift α.
Welfare Loss and Option Values
Although the owner chooses the value-maximizing contract to provide an incentive for the manager to extend effort, the agency problem ultimately still proves costly. In an ownermanaged firm, the manager will extend effort and will exercise the option at the first-best stopping time. However, in firms with delegated management, there will be a welfare loss due to the firm's suboptimal exercise strategy.
By a welfare loss, we are referring to the difference between the values of the first-best option value, V * (P 0 ) in (9) , and the sum of the owner and manager options, π o (P 0 ) and (31) and (32) . Thus, define the welfare loss due to agency issues as L, where
Simplifying, we have:
This welfare loss is likely to have economic ramifications on the structure of firms. For firms in industries with potentially large welfare losses due to agency costs, there will be powerful forces that will push them to be privately held, or to be organized in a manner that provides the closest alignment between owners and managers.
There are two effects of a later-than-first-best exercising trigger (P J > P * 2 ) on the welfare loss L: (i) a larger cash flow P J + θ 2 − K > P * 2 + θ 2 − K reduces welfare loss, ceteris paribus, and (ii) a lower discount factor [(P 0 /P J ) β < (P 0 /P * 2 ) β ] increases the welfare loss. The latter dominates the former, because P J > P * 2 and P * 2 = arg max (P 0 /x) β (P 0 + θ 2 − K). Equation (45) suggests that welfare loss is driven by the distance of the equilibrium trigger P J from P * 2 . As previously discussed, the firm's exercise timing becomes less distorted as the net cost benefit ratio of inducing effort increases. That is, as the ratio ξ/∆q increases, the equilibrium trigger P J gets closer to the first-best trigger P * 2 , and thus:
In terms of the owner's option value, the incentive problem represents a trade-off between timing efficiency and the surplus that must be paid to the manager to extend effort. One can obtain better intuition on the forces at work in the agency problem through the following decomposition. In the first-best solution, the owner pays the cost of effort ξ and obtains the first-best option value V * (P 0 ). In the agency equilibrium, the owner delegates the cost of effort to the manager, but then holds the sub-optimal option value π o (P 0 ). The loss in the owner's option value due to the incentive problem is therefore given by:
where L is the total welfare loss given in (45), and V m is the ex-ante expected surplus paid to the manager to exert effort, and is given by:
Decomposing the loss in the owner's option value given in (47) into the sum of the timing component (L) and the compensation component (V m ) is useful for providing intuition.
When the owner delegates the option exercise decision to the manager, the owner's option value is lowered for two reasons: (i) the exercising inefficiency induced by agency and informational asymmetry; and (ii) the surplus needed to pay the manager to induce him to extend effort and reveal his private information. The impact of a higher effort cost ξ represents a trade-off in terms of the timing and compensation components. As shown in (46), a higher effort cost results in more efficient investment timing. This must be traded-off against the increased compensation that must be paid to provide appropriate incentives to the manager, as seen in (48). Therefore, the total effect on the loss of owner's option value due to an increase in ξ depends on whether the "timing effect" or "compensation effect" is larger, in
If the investment trigger P J is significantly larger than P * 2 , in that
then an increase in ξ leads to a smaller loss in the owner's option value, as the gain in timing efficiency overshadows the loss due to the manager's increased compensation. 23 
Impatient Managers and Early Investment
In the model, both owners and managers value payoffs identically. However, it may be the case that managers are more impatient than owners. There are several potential justifications for such an assumption. First, there are various models of managerial myopia that attempt to explain a manager's preference for choosing projects with quicker pay-backs, even in the face of eschewing more valuable long-term opportunities. For example, Narayanan (1985) and Stein (1989) argue that concerns about either the firm's short-term performance or labormarket reputation may give managers an incentive to take actions that pay off in the near term at the expense of the longer term. Second, in our "investment timing" setting, greater impatience can represent the manager's preference for empire building or greater perquisite consumption and reputation that comes from running a larger business sooner rather than later. Third, managerial short-termism could be the result of the manager facing stochastic termination. 24 This termination, for example, could be due to the manager leaving for a better job elsewhere or being fired. We can model such stochastic termination by supposing that the manager faces an exogenous termination driven by a Poisson process with intensity 23 Note that the above condition is non-empty. This can be seen as follows. Condition (51) is equivalent to
The joint hidden action/hidden information region is characterized by P * 2 ≤ PJ ≤ P * 3 . Therefore, the above condition is met for some PJ . 24 We assume that the owner can costlessly replace the manager in the event of separation.
ζ. The addition of stochastic termination transforms the manager's option to one in which his discount rate r is elevated to r + ζ to reflect the stochastic termination. 25 Phrased in real options terms, managerial impatience leads to a smaller option to wait for the manager, potentially reversing the previously mentioned larger "option to wait" that results from the standard contracting model. Thus, this generalization leads to very different predictions about investment timing. While the basic model predicts that investment will never occur earlier than the first-best case, in this generalized setting investment can occur earlier or later than the first-best case. This is similar to the result found in Stulz (1990) where there is both over-and under-investment in the capital allocation decision, as shareholders use debt to constrain managerial empire-building preferences.
Recall that the owner discounts future cash flows by the discount function D(P 0 ;P ) = P 0 /P β for P 0 <P . We can therefore represent greater managerial impatience by defining a managerial discount function D m (P 0 ;P ) = P 0 /P γ , where γ > β ensures that D m (P 0 ;P ) < D(P 0 ;P ). That is, a dollar received at the stopping timeP is worth less to the manager than to the owner. 26 This generalized problem is basically the same as that of Section 2, with the exception that the constraints all use γ rather than β. In addition, much of the solution is similar.
For example, Propositions 1 and 2 apply as before, using the same proof. In addition, Proposition 3 and 4 remain valid, and are demonstrated in Appendix C. Thus, the optimal contracting problem in the generalized setting can be written as:
Similar to Proposition 5, at least one of (53) and (54) binds. Otherwise, the owner may strictly increases his payoff by lowering the wage payment w 1 without violating any constraints.
Just as in Section 3, there are three contracting regions: a hidden information region, a joint hidden information/hidden action region, and a hidden action region, depending on the level of cost/benefit ratio ξ/∆q. In this section, we focus on the joint hidden information/hidden action region. 27 The joint hidden information/hidden action region is defined by: (P 0 /P * 3 ) γ ∆θ < ξ/∆q < (P 0 /P * 2 ) γ ∆θ, whereP * 3 is defined in (C.11), and shown to be greater than the trigger P * 2 . In this region the optimal contract can be written as:
whereP 1 is the root of H(x) = 0, defined by
Unlike the results of the basic model, we now have the possibility of investment occurring before the first-best trigger, in that P 1 =P 1 < P * 1 . To see this, note that H(0) = P * 1 and
The derivative of H( · ) is
Therefore, there exists a unique solution P 1 =P 1 < P * 1 . As in the basic model, the trigger strategy for the manager of a θ 2 -type project is greater than the first-best trigger, P * 2 . Recall thatP J > P * 2 in the region (P 0 /P * 3 ) γ ∆θ < ξ/∆q < (P 0 /P * 2 ) γ ∆θ, where P * 3 is given in (C.11). However, for γ > β, the trigger is closer to the first-best trigger than for the standard case in which γ = β. This is true, since for γ > β,
Thus, when the manager is more impatient than the owner, equilibrium investment occurs sooner than it does in the standard principal-agent model described earlier in the paper. In particular, investment actually occurs prior to the first-best trigger for the θ 1 -type project.
The greater impatience on the part of the manager implies that it is in the owner's interest to offer a contract that motivates earlier exercise. This results in both costs and benefits to the owner. By motivating investment for the θ 2 -type project earlier than the standard principal-agent model, investment timing moves closer to the first-best. Since the manager receives no surplus for the θ 2 -type project, the owner is the sole beneficiary of this timing efficiency. However, investment for the θ 1 -type project occurs earlier than that in the model of Section 2, which is the first-best outcome. Therefore, the owner is worse off with respect to the θ 1 -type projects for two reasons: investment occurs too early, and the wage paid to the manager in this state must be higher (than in the standard model) in order to motivate earlier investment. The net effect on ex-ante owner's option value is ambiguous and is driven by the relative parameter values.
Conclusion
This paper extends the real options framework to account for the agency and information issues that are prevalent in many real-world applications. When investment decisions are delegated to managers, contracts must be designed that provide incentives for the manager to both extend effort and to truthfully reveal their private information. This paper provides a model of optimal contracting in a continuous-time principal-agent setting in which there is both moral hazard and adverse selection. The implied investment behavior differs significantly from that of the first-best no-agency solution. In particular, there will be greater inertia in investment, as the model leads to the manager having an even greater option to wait than the owner. The interplay between the twin forces of hidden information and hidden action leads to markedly different investment outcomes than when only one of the two forces is at work. Allowing the manager to have an effort choice that affects the likelihood of getting a high quality project mitigates the investment inefficiency due to informational asymmetry.
When the model is generalized to include differing degrees of impatience between owners and managers, we find that investment may occur either earlier or later than optimal.
Some extensions of the model would prove interesting. First, the model could allow for repeated investment decisions. This richer setting would permit owners to update their beliefs over time, and for managers to establish reputations. Second, the model could also be generalized to include competition in both the labor and product markets. As shown by Grenadier (2002) , the forces of competition greatly alter the investment behavior implied by standard real options models.
Appendices

A Solution to the Optimal Contracting Problem
This appendix provides a derivation of the optimal contracts detailed in Section 3.
Propositions 1 and 2 allow us to express the owner's objective as maximizing the value of his option, given in (13), subject to (15), (17), (18) and w 2 ≥ 0. Using the method of Kuhn-Tucker, we form the Lagrangian as follows:
with corresponding complementary slackness conditions for the four constraints.
The first-order condition with respect to w 1 gives
The first-order condition with respect to w 2 implies
Simplifying (A.3) gives λ 4 = (P 0 /P 2 ) β /q H > 0. Therefore, the complementary slackness condition λ 4 w 2 = 0 implies that w 2 = 0. This proves Proposition 3.
The first-order conditions with respect to P 1 and P 2 imply:
We conjecture that the ex-post incentive constraint for the manager of a θ 2 -type project, (18) , does not bind, in that λ 2 = 0. We verify this conjecture, formalized in Proposition 4 for each region. With λ 2 = 0, then (A.2) may be written as λ 1 + λ 3 = 1. Therefore, it must be the case that at least one of (21) and (22) binds (Proposition 5). Combining the conjecture λ 2 = 0 with (A.4) gives P 1 = P * 1 (Proposition 6). Thus, we have shown that provided we verify that (18) does not bind, the owner's optimization problem is summarized in equations (20)- (22) . This problem is now solved below.
A.1 The Hidden Information Only Region
Suppose that the ex-ante incentive constraint (22) does not bind. Since (21) must hold as an equality and λ 1 = 1, (A.5) implies P 2 = P * 3 where P * 3 is given in (25) and w 1 is given in (26) . The inequality P * 1 < P * 3 implies (18) does not bind, as conjectured. Finally, in order to be consistent with the assumption that (22) does not bind, we require that ξ/∆q < (P 0 /P * 3 ) β ∆θ, the parameter range defining this hidden information only region.
A.2 The Joint Hidden Information/Hidden Action Region
We derive the optimal contract in this region by conjecturing that both (21) and (22) bind.
Solving these two equality constraints gives (29) and (30) . The inequality P J > P * 1 confirms that (18) does not bind, as conjectured. The solution for P 2 implies that λ 1 can be written as:
The only possible region under which both constraints may bind 28 is characterized by
We now show that indeed both (21) and (22) bind throughout this entire region. The region characterized by (A.7) can be equivalently expressed as P * 2 < P J < P * 3 . Because (A.6) implies that λ 1 is monotonically increasing in P J , therefore, 0 < λ 1 < 1 in this region. Since λ 3 = 1 − λ 1 , we also have 0 < λ 3 < 1. By complementary slackness conditions, both (21) and (22) bind in this joint region, confirming the result that (A.7) is the whole region, with both constraints binding. 29
A.3 The Hidden Action Only Region
Suppose that (21) does not bind and (22) binds, then λ 1 = 0 by complementary slackness, and λ 3 = 1. Therefore, P 2 = P * 2 given in (33) and w 1 is given in (34) . We need to verify that (21) and (18) β ∆θ, then supporting high effort is no longer in the owner's interest. 29 We also need additional technical conditions to ensure that inducing the manager to extend high effort is in the interest of the owner. P * 1 < P J < P * 2 , which is identical to the condition (P 0 /P * 2 ) β ∆θ < ξ/∆q < (P 0 /P * 1 ) β ∆θ, that defines this region.
If the parameters do not fall in any of the three regions, namely, ξ/∆q > (P 0 /P * 1 ) β ∆θ then it can be shown that the owner will not choose to motivate the manager to exert effort.
The cost of effort is so high as to overwhelm any potential benefits of motivating effort. A proof of this result is available from the authors upon request.
B Optimal Contracting with a Continuous Distribution of θ
This appendix contains the derivation of the optimal contracts when the distribution of the project's unobserved component θ of cash flows is continuous.
Denote the manager's time-zero expected utility as u(θ, θ), if he reports that his privately observed present value of cash flows isθ, and the true level of his privately observed value is θ. His time-zero expected utility is then given by
We denote U (θ) as the (truth-telling) manager's utility whose privately observed component of cash flows is θ. That is,
As in Section 2, we denote ξ as the cost of extending effort at time zero. Let F H (θ) and F L (θ) be the cumulative distribution functions of θ drawn if the manager extends effort and if he does not extend effort, respectively. Using the revelation principle, we may write the principal's optimization problem as follows:
3) subject to:
1. ex-post incentive-compatibility condition: 3. ex-ante incentive compatibility condition:
4. ex-ante participation constraint:
Proposition 8. The ex-ante participation constraint (B.7) does not bind.
Proof. The ex-ante incentive constraint (B.6) and the limited-liability condition (B.5) together imply that the ex-ante participation constraint (B.7) does not bind.
First, we simplify the ex-ante incentive constraint (B.6) using integration by parts. This
Next, we simplify the ex-post incentive-compatibility condition (B.4) by totally differentiating U (θ), the utility for a truth-telling manager of a type-θ project, with respect to θ. Since the manager optimally reveals his project quality by choosing recommended equilibrium strategy, we have u 1 (θ, θ) = 0. Therefore, we have U (θ) = u 2 . Integration gives
This gives
We note that the Spence-Mirrlees condition is satisfied. 30 A standard result in the contracting literature with asymmetric information states that the limited-liability condition for a manager of a θ-type project binds, in that U (θ) = w(θ) = 0.
30 Details are available upon request.
Therefore, the informational rent U (θ) that accrues to the manager of a θ-type project is given by
The relationship between U (θ) and the equilibrium wage implies that
Using (B.13), we simplify the present value of expected wage payment as follows:
is the inverse of the hazard rate under F H ( · ).
Using (B.14) allows us to simplify the principal's optimization problem as follows: 
B.1 The Hidden Information Only Region
If effort cost ξ is low enough, then no additional rent is needed to induce the manager to extend effort. The following condition ensures that the ex-ante incentive constraint (B.8)
does not bind.
Maximizing (B.16) may be done point by point. This gives the candidate optimal trigger level P (θ) = P * 3 (θ), where P * 3 (θ) is given in (B.18). Because λ H (θ) > 0, the exercise trigger is larger than the first-best level, confirming the intuition delivered in Section 3 using the two-point distribution of θ. A verification easily confirms that (B.8) does not bind under Condition 1.
The following condition ensures that the candidate trigger strategy is positive for any θ.
Condition 2.
For all θ on the support, θ − λ H (θ) < K .
Finally, we ensure that the candidate trigger strategy decreases in θ by requiring the following condition:
It is straightforward to note that Conditions 2 and 3 also imply that wage is positive and increases in the project quality θ, as seen from (B.13).
B.2 The Joint Hidden Information/Hidden Action Region
When the effort cost is higher, both the ex-ante incentive constraint (B.6) and the ex-post incentive constraint (B.4) bind. The condition governing the parameters for this region when θ is drawn from a continuous distribution is given as follows.
where P * 3 (θ) is given in (B.18) and
Denote l as the Lagrangian multiplier for (B.8). Then, the candidate equilibrium trigger strategy is given by
The Lagrangian multiplier l is positive under Condition 4. Therefore, the optimal trigger with the exception of the one for the manager of the lowest quality project θ is larger than the first-best P * (θ) = β(K − θ)/(β − 1). Because (B.8) holds with strict equality, we may combine (B.8), (B.12) and (B.21) in order to obtain
Solving the above equation gives the Lagrangian multiplier l. It is straightforward to show that the Lagrangian multiplier l increases in effort cost ξ, in that
(B.23)
Therefore, as effort cost ξ increases, the optimal trigger P J (θ) decreases, as shown below:
This is consistent with our intuition and results in Section 3 that a higher effort cost mitigates investment inefficiency by pushing the exercise trigger towards the first-best level.
The following two conditions ensure that the conjectured candidate solutions P J (θ) is positive and decreasing in θ.
This implies M (θ) ≥ 0, for all θ.
We note that, under Conditions 5 and 6, wage is positive and increasing in θ, in that
for θ 2 > θ 1 . The first inequality follows from the monotonicity of P (θ).
C Derivations of Optimal Contracts in Section 5
This appendix provides a derivation of the optimal contracts for the generalized model of Section 5. Propositions 1 and 2 apply as in Section 2. Using the method of Kuhn-Tucker, we form the Lagrangian as follows:
with corresponding complementary slackness conditions for the four constraints. As in Appendix A, we also conjecture that the ex-post incentive constraint does not bind, in that the Lagrangian multiplier λ 2 associated with the constraint below is zero:
We will verify this conjecture for each region.
The first-order conditions with respect to w 1 and w 2 imply
Using (C.3) to simplify (C.4) gives λ 4 > 0. The complementary slackness condition implies that w 2 = 0. The first-order conditions with respect to P 1 and P 2 are given by
Therefore, it must be the case that at least one of (53) and (54) binds (Similar to Proposition 5 of Section 2). Depending on the cost benefit ratio ξ/∆q, we have three disjoint regions to be analyzed below, similar to the analyses in Section 3.
C.1 The Hidden Information Only Region
Suppose that the constraint (54) does not bind and thus λ 3 = 0. Then, λ 1 = (P 0 /P 1 ) β−γ > 1. A binding ex-ante incentive constraint (53) implies that the wage payment is w 1 = (P 1 /P 2 ) γ ∆θ . The first-order conditions (C.5) and (C.6) give the following coupled equations:
∆θ , (C.7)
(C.8)
Note that with γ > β, we immediately have P 1 < P * 1 and P 2 > P * 2 . Therefore, w 1 < ∆θ, as conjectured, confirming that (C.2) does not bind and λ 2 = 0.
Define the ratio x = P 1 /P 2 . The coupled equations (C.7) and (C. Therefore, for the region defined by ξ/∆q < (P/P * 3 ) γ ∆θ, wherê
the optimal contract can be written as:
P 2 =P * 3 , (C.13)
∆θ, (C.14)
Finally, if ξ/∆q < (P 0 /P * 3 ) γ ∆θ, constraint (54) is indeed not binding, consistent with our conjecture.
C.2 The Joint Hidden Information/Hidden Action Region
We derive the optimal contract in this region by conjecturing that both (53) and (54) bind.
Solving these two equality constraints gives (56) and (57). Plugging (56) and (57) into the first-order condition (C.5) gives
The solution for P 1 isP 1 , the same solution for P 1 as in the hidden action region. In Section 5 we proved that a uniqueP 1 exists, whereP 1 ∈ (0, P * 1 ). Naturally, we have w 1 = P 1 /P J γ ∆θ. As before, we have verified that (C.2) does not bind in this region, becauseP 1 <P J implies that w 1 < ∆θ.
We know that the only possible regions in which both (53) and (54) bind is (P 0 /P * 3 ) γ ∆θ ≤ ξ/∆q ≤ (P 0 /P * 2 ) γ ∆θ, since we have already shown that in the other regions only one of these constraints binds. 31 Equivalently stated in terms ofP J , this region is characterized by P * 2 <P J <P * 3 . We now verify that the above solutions are indeed optimal for this entire region. Recall that λ 1 + λ 3 = P 0 /P 1 β−γ . Therefore, if we show that λ 1 lies within the range defined by 0 < λ 1 < P 0
then we have shown both (53) and (54) bind (λ 1 , λ 3 = 0).
The first-order condition with respect to P 2 implies that
(C.18)
SinceP J > P * 2 , we have confirmed that λ 1 > 0. We next prove that λ 1 < P 0 /P 1 β−γ .
Expressing λ 1 as a function ofP J , we can rewrite (C.18) as:
Note that from (C.16),P 1 is a function ofP J ; we make this functional dependence explicit in the above equation. Proving that λ 1 < P 0 /P 1 β−γ over the regionP J ∈ (P * 2 ,P * 3 ) is equivalent to showing that N (x) > 0, for x ∈ (P * 2 ,P * 3 ), 31 Note that in the region ξ/∆q > (P0/P1) γ ∆θ, it can be shown that effort cannot be induced. This result is available upon request. Using implicit differentiation in (C.16), we can write:
γ(P 1 (x) − P * 1 ) γ(P 1 (x) − P * 1 ) −P 1 (x) > 0, (C.21) becauseP 1 (x) < P * 1 in this region. Therefore,
From (C.21),
x dP 1 (x) dx −P 1 (x) = P 1 (x) 2 γ(P 1 (x) − P * 1 ) −P 1 (x) < 0, (C.23) becauseP 1 (x) < P * 1 in this region. Therefore, N (x) < 0, for x ∈ (P * 2 ,P * 3 ). Since N (P * 3 ) = 0, we thus have N (x) > 0 for x ∈ (P * 2 ,P * 3 ). This confirms that λ 1 , λ 3 > 0 in this entire region, and therefore both (53) and (54) bind.
C.3 The Hidden Action Only Region
Suppose that (54) binds, while (53) does not. Thus, λ 1 = 0 and λ 3 = (P 0 /P 1 ) β−γ > 1. With λ 1 = 0, equation (C.6) implies that P 2 = P * 2 . A binding (54) implies that the wage payment is
whereP J is given in (56). Substituting (C.24) into (C.5) gives P 1 =P 1 , the root of the expression given in (59). Section 5 proves that a uniqueP 1 exists, whereP 1 ∈ (0, P * 1 ). To ensure that our conjecture that (C.2) is not binding, (C.24) implies that we need to check ifP 1 <P J holds. This inequality can be written as ξ/∆q < (P 0 /P 1 ) γ ∆θ, which is assured to hold in this region. In order to be consistent with the fact that (53) does not bind, we need (P 0 /P * 2 ) γ ∆θ > ξ/∆q, which again holds in this region. plot the equilibrium trigger strategy P 2 and wage payment w 1 in terms of effort cost ξ, respectively. As the cost of effort increases, the hidden action problem becomes more pronounced. The upper graph demonstrates that as the cost of effort increases, the equilibrium trigger strategy P 2 decreases, as it approaches the first best trigger P * 2 . The lower graph demonstrates that as the cost of effort increases, the wage payment must increase in order to induce effort from the manager. In summary, as the cost of inducing hidden effort increases, the timing of investment becomes more efficient while the value of the compensation package increases. Figure 2 : Stock price reaction to investment. This graph plots the stock price as a function of P , the present value of the observed component of cash flows. Whenever the level of P is below the lower investment trigger P * 1 , the market does not know the true value of θ, the present value of the unobserved component of cash flows. Thus, for all P below P * 1 , the stock price equals the value of the owner's option given in (31) . At the moment the process P hits the trigger P * 1 , the true value of θ is revealed through the manager's action: if the manager invests, then the value of θ is the higher value θ 1 ; if the manager does not invest, then the value of θ is the lower value θ 2 . Thus, the stock price is discontinuous at P * 1 . Investment signals good news and the stock price jumps to S u , while failure to invest signals bad news and the stock price drops to S d , where S u and S d are given in (37) and (38), respectively.
